Walt Disney World Co. vs Aloysia Wood

515 So. 2d 198 (1987) WALT DISNEY humankind CO. , et al. , Petiti geniusrs, v. Aloysia WOOD, et al. , Respondents. controlling Court of Florida. (with professor edits) Aloysia forest was injured in November 1971 at the grand prix attraction at Walt Disney World (Disney), when her fiance, Daniel Wood, rammed from the rear the vehicle which she was driving. Aloysia Wood filed suit against Disney, and Disney sought contribution from Daniel Wood After trial, the control board returned a verdict finding Aloysia Wood 14% at crack, Daniel Wood 85% at fault, and Disney 1% at fault.The jury assessed Woods damages at $75,000. The beg entered judgment against Disney for 86% of the damages. Disney subsequently moved to alter the judgment to resound the jurys finding that Disney was only 1% at fault. The court denied the motion. On appeal, the one-fourth district affirmed the judgment **** In Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973), this Court throw a path the rule of contributory slackness, which Florida had followed since at least 1886, and adopted the pure relative negligence standard. *** In adopting comparative degree negligence, this Court expressly declared deuce purposes for the change in judicial policy (1) To allow a jury to apportion fault as it sees fit between listless parties whose negligence was part of the legal and proximate piddle of any loss or spot and (2) To apportion the total damages resulting from the loss or stigma according to the proportionate fault of separately party. ***** The real issue in advance us is whether we should now replace the doctrine of correlative and several(prenominal) indebtedness with one in which the financial obligation of co defendants to the plaintiff is apportioned according to each defendants respective fault.According to Disney, this Court in Hoffman set for itself the goal of creating a tort system that fairly and equitably allocated damages according to the degrees of fault. T presentfore, a de fendant should only be held responsible to the extent of his fault in the equal way as a plaintiff under comparative negligence. enunciate and several liability is a judicially created doctrine. Louisville N. R. R. v. Allen, 67 Fla. 257, 65 So. 8 (1914). This Court may alter a rule of law where coarse social upheaval dictates its necessity. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d 435. The social pheaval which is said to spend a penny occurred here is the fundamental alteration of Florida tort law encompassed by the adoption of comparative negligence. Following the adoption of comparative negligence, almost states have passed laws eliminating correlative and several liability, and the courts of several others have judicially abolished the doctrine. E. g. , Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P. 2d 867 (1978) Bartlett v. current Mexico Welding Supply, Inc. , 98 N. M. 152, 646 P. 2d 579 (Ct. App. ), cert. denied, 98 N. M. 336, 648 P. 2d 794 (1982) Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P. 2d 1071 (Okla. 1978). The Kansas Supreme Court in Brown v.Keill reasoned There is nonhing inherently fair about a defendant who is 10% at fault pay uping 100% of the loss, and there is no social policy that should fix defendants to pay more than their fair share of the loss. Plaintiffs now take the parties as they find them. If one of the parties at fault happens to be a better half or a governmental agency and if by reason of some competing social policy the plaintiff cannot receive payment for his injuries from the spouse or agency, there is no compelling social policy which requires the codefendant to pay more than his fair share of the loss.The same is true if one of the defendants is cockeyed and the other is not. Brown, 224 Kan. at 203, 580 P. 2d at 874. On the other hand, the absolute majority of courts which have faced the issue in jurisdictions with comparative negligence have ruled that joint and several liability should be retained. E. g. , Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P. 2d 426 (Alaska 1979) American Motorcycle Assn v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P. 2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978) play out v. Union Oil Co. , 100 Idaho 590, 603 P. 2d 156 (1979) Coney v. J. L. G. Industries, Inc. 97 Ill. 2d 104, 73 Ill. Dec. 337, 454 N. E. 2d 197 (1983) Kirby Bldg. Sys. v. Mineral Explorations, 704 P. 2d 1266 (Wyo. 1985). The Illinois Supreme Court in Coney v. J. L. G. Industries, Inc. gave four reasons justifying the retention of joint and several liability (1) The feasibility of apportioning fault on a comparative basis does not render an indivisible injury divisible for purposes of the joint and several liability rule. A concurrent tortfeasor is liable for the whole of an indivisible injury when his negligence is a proximate caseful of that damage.In many instances, the negligence of a concurrent tortfeasor may be sufficient by itself to cause the entire loss. The mere fact that it may be possible to plead some percentage figure to the relative culpability o f one negligent defendant as compared to another does not in any way suggest that each defendants negligence is not a proximate cause of the entire indivisible injury. (2) In those instances where the plaintiff is not guilty of negligence, he would be forced to bear a portion of the loss should one of the tortfeasors prove financially unable to satisfy his share of the damages. 3) Even in cases where a plaintiff is partially at fault, his culpability is not equivalent to that of a defendant. The plaintiffs negligence relates only to a lack of receivable assistance for his own safety while the defendants negligence relates to a lack of due care for the safety of others the latter is tortious, but the former is not. (4) Elimination of joint and several liability would work a serious and unwarranted foul effect on the ability of an injured plaintiff to obtain suitable compensation for his injuries. Coney, 97 Ill. 2d at 121-22, 73 Ill.Dec. at 345, 454 N. E. 2d at 205 (citations omit ted). ***** While recognizing the logic in Disneys position, we cannot say with certainty that joint and several liability is an unjust doctrine or that it should necessarily be eliminated upon the adoption of comparative negligence. In view of the public policy considerations stance on the issue, this Court believes that the viability of the doctrine is a matter which should best be decided by the legislature. Consequently, we approve the decision of the district court of appeal. It is so ordered.