Interpersonal, Group and Collective Behavior Dynamics Essay Example for Free

Interpersonal, Group and Collective Behavior Dynamics raiseEnron is a comp any that is faced with fiscal instability but continues to run on dubious traffic including misrepresenting their true financial position (Cohan, 2002). This is d hotshot to save the public image of the company hence avoiding the jeopardize of losing investors. American International Group (AIG) is too in a serious financial crisis following cases of misdirection (FRB, 2009). We shall make a comparison of the group dynamics and internal politics within these deuce companies. The companies exhibited an portion of breeding blockage. This is holding back adverse news from the public until the last possible moment. This is usually a deliberate act with the aim of maintaining a good public image. It is however followed by lawsuits, hate mails or scour death affrights from unhappy investors. In Enrons case, the senior executives withheld any instruction about financial crisis from the public until it clangd (Cohan, 2002). AIG maintained a business as usual image in the public disrespect its liquidity issues (FRB, 2009).Motivation to lie or deliberately concealing the truth in an organization was sheer in the two companies. The corporate officers do non disclose the truth especially when this truth may put the company into bankruptcy or cost them their jobs. In the case of Enron the lies were inform of hard data, assembly about accounting results and a stream of earnings (Williamson, 1970). Questionable accounting practices were meant to hide huge losings that the company suffered. AIG had its sh atomic number 18 of deliberate lies when it valued its A-A and sub prime property at 1.7 twice the value used by Lehman. The issue of the boards oversight function and the business judging rule is also fairly unornamented in the two companies he board of directors act as if they are entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something wrong happens (Crag Rebecca, 1996) . The directors of Enron were totally unaware of the rigour of the companys financial crisis until its collapse. A directors were too ignorant of the liquidity problem to the extend of training for a lavish retreat for themselves.The subordinate managers have persuasive interest in concealing the magnanimous news. This is meant to avoid or delay personal embarrassment and other associated risks such as the likelihood of a price drop in its shares. In Enron, individual executives who decided to hide the dubious partnership feared corroding of status (Cohan, 2002). They felt that they needed to protect both their self and external image. The same case was evident in AIG, where the subordinate managers saw the need for over costing their assets to redeem their image.Overconfidence and optimism is displayed in the two companies by the senior executives especially in press releases. Overconfidence creates a strong image for any company in the eyes of the public . Executives who are overconfident and optimistic are considered to be successful managers. This is because they are able to persuade and influence people even in the face of a crisis. The executives in Enron and AIG were also in the bid of making a name for themselves. Senior executives assured employees would continuously rise even in the event of financial instability in Enron.The captain executive officer in AIG assured investors that they would still get their bonuses even as the company was being bailed out (FRB, 2009). Corporate culture cannot be ruled out in the forethought of the two companies. This refers to the norms of the company which are well known to the management and the subordinate employees. They supersede other business or ethical laws in case of a conflict. Cynism as a corporate culture fosters the breaking of rules as a means to succeed. Ethical rules are downstairs enforced with the focus being to maximize profits.The Enron and AIG were caught up in this culture when they faced a financial crisis. They misrepresented their debts and assets respectively in the companys sheet so as to reflect broad(prenominal) profits and attract investors (Cohan, 2002). All this is done in total disregard for accounting ethics. Myopic information within the organization is also prevalent in the two companies. This might be due to our hold cognitive capabilities but more so because the executives are too busy to deal with abundant data. They elect sifting this data and extracting barely what is relevant.They may also be lacking the skill to analyze and represent the data as was the case of Enrons former chairman Mr. Kenneth Lay. The directors in AIG and Enron, focused on information that confirmed their prior attitudes of leading institutions in the market. They disregarded any disconfirming information of possible collapse or liquidity issues. This is normally referred to as cognitive dissonance. It is usually difficult to change these beliefs a s one is seen as a threat to the companys status quo. Ms. Watkins, an employee in Enron became such a threat by warning a senior manager of a possible collapse (Cohan, 2002).A chief executive officers proposal in AIG was ignored on the same basis (FRB, 2009). bullying of subordinate employees by the senior employees is prevalent in Enron but not in AIG. In Enron, investigations against Mr. Andrew a former chief financial officer and other senior officers who were involved in fraud cases did not happen since no one was confident enough to confront them (Cohan, 2002). In AIG the accounting scandal is good investigated and no one is spared including a former chairman of the board.REFERENCES Federal Reserve Bank. (2009). History and development of AIG. Retrieved may 26,2009, from http//www. federalbank. orf/history/development. pdf Herbert, A. S. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. John, A. C. (2002). I didnt know and I was only doing my job. Has corporate governance careen ed out of control? A case study of Enrons information myopia. Journal of Business Ethics, 40 (3),275-299. Paul Z. Janet A. (1997). The social influence of confidence in group closing making.